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Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy
Randal C. Picker*
We are in the midst of two large related shifts in our computing
platform both of which are tied to identity. The first shift, which
often travels under the name Web 2.0, is fundamentally about
what we use computers to do. We have moved from creating
documents in Microsoft Office to living life online: searching on
Google, buying and selling on eBay, hanging out with our friends
on mySpace and Facebook, watching the newest viral video on
YouTube or blasting out tweets on Twitter. These new
intermediaries sit at the crossroads of the matching and
coordination that define how we use the Internet today. The
second shift, often called cloud computing, is more about a change
in the organization of the fundamental processes of computing—
computation and storage—with some overlap with the Web 2.0
shift. Instead of storing my email on my laptop, I will just
outsource storage and store it with Google or another cloud-service
provider. I won’t have an email product resident on my computer;
instead, Google will provide an email service through a Web
browser.
These shifts have one key point in common: the possibility of
creating prodigious amounts of data about end users. Those
intermediaries—Google originally but increasingly Facebook as
well—have access to extraordinarily detailed information about
their customers. In Google’s case, that information is tied most
directly to the web browser on my computer. Not my identity
directly, but the window through which I visit websites. Not me as
me but instead browser-me. My use of Google and other websites
* Copyright © 2008-09, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo
Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and
Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne
National Laboratory. I thank the John M. Olin Foundation and the Paul H. Leffmann
Fund for their generous research support. I also thank Microsoft for funding that
supported this work.
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tied into Google’s advertising infrastructure creates a rich picture
of me for Google, or more precisely, of whomever is surfing the
Internet using the browser identified to my computer.
Many of these services—eBay, Facebook and Twitter—require
an online identity for use and others often work better if an
identity is established. Cloud computing services also depend on
identity: if I store my email remotely, I need to be able to identify
myself to see my email (and not your email) and to make sure that
you can’t read my email. This doesn’t need to be actual me, but I
need to be represented by a consistent authenticatable identity.
And if we introduced payment for these services, then we have to
tie that identity to an online payment means and that will often get
us back to actual me. These cloud-service providers will also have
available to them a rich datastream that arises from their
customer’s activities. This combination of identity and an ongoing
stream of interactions with remote computers make it possible for
service providers to know a great deal about me. My direct
revelation of information coupled with information revealed during
identified use creates a rich information profile about me or at least
about my online identity, my avatar me as it were.
That information can be used to improve their core
businesses—adding collective intelligence to search to increase
relevance—and to finance—through advertising backed by rich
databases that allows ads to be matched to individual customers—
virtually any content or service that can be provided through a
screen. The advertising that supports much of the content on the
Internet is more valuable if it can be matched to my actual
interests, and the flexibility of the web in delivering content means
that web advertising is increasingly tailored advertising, or socalled behavioral advertising.
We seem to be in the midst of a perhaps defining change in
how we pay for content. The change is driven by the technology of
the Internet, and that technology matters in two important ways,
first in the way that it changes the ease with which content can be
copied and distributed and second in the way that advertising can
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be matched to content and individuals. The first change has
weakened the integrity of the copy as a means of organizing paying
for content. An individual possessing a digital copy of a song can
distribute it around the world in an instant without any payments
for the content at all. If copies cannot be sold reliably, we will need
to switch how we finance the underlying creative works. One way
to do that is to pay for those works using advertising, just as we
have done in the U.S. with broadcast TV and radio.
The second change is the way in which online advertising can
be matched with content and with the person reading it. This is ad
personalization or—different phrase—behavioral targeting. When
two people read a news story on MSNBC.com, there is no reason
that they need to see the same ad. If I was looking at Honda’s
website five minutes before visiting MSNBC’s site, it probably
makes sense to show me a car ad, but if you just bought a car, you
should see an ad for something else. Ad personalization depends
on information about the individual reading the story. That
information could arise from any number of sources, but the
clickstream that we create as we surf the Internet probably presents
unrivaled access to information about us. And again the more that
I use online services through a particular identity the more
information the identity provider will have about me to support
that advertising.
How we choose to regulate these datastreams is the central
regulatory issue of the emerging computer infrastructure and we
are at an early stage in that regulation.1 Our choices here obviously
1 Early steps include two interpretations of the European Union’s Data Protection
Directive (95/46/EC) by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party created pursuant
to the directive. See Opinion 1/2008 on data processing issues related to search engines,
April
4,
2008
(online
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp148_en.pdf) (“Article
29 Search Engine Opinion”) and Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, June 12,
2009
(online
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf) (“Article
29 SNS Opinion”). See also Federal Trade Commission, Self-Regulatory Principles for
Online
Behavioral
Advertising,
February,
2009
(online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf) (“FTC Behavioral Ads
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have privacy consequences but also for how much competition will
emerge. These are tightly linked. In the past, we have regulated
intermediaries at these transactional bottlenecks—banks, cable
companies, phone companies and the like—and limited the ways
in which they can use the information that they see. Presumably
the same forces that animated those rules—fundamental concerns
about customer privacy—need to be assessed for our new
information intermediaries.
In doing that, we need to be acutely aware of how our choices
influence competition. An uneven playing field—allowing one firm
to use the information that it sees while blocking others from
doing the same thing—creates market power through limiting
competition. And privacy rules that limit how information can be
used and shared across firms will artificially push towards greater
consolidation, something which again usually works against
maintaining robust competition.
Section I of the paper briefly sketches the emergence of the
new Web-based computing platform. Section II focuses on how
datastreams arise as we switch from computing products to
computing services. That switch need not give rise to a change in
how detailed consumer use information is handled, though so far,
it clearly has done so. The ability of these datastreams to be
leveraged across products suggests that, to pick the most
prominent example, Google can scale up its services in a
substantial way. Indeed, if you take Google’s mission statement
seriously—“to organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful”—this is exactly Google’s plan.2

Report”). On June 18, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives also conducted extensive
hearings
on
behavioral
advertising
(online
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=167
8:energy-and-commerce-subcommittee-hearing-on-behavioral-advertising-industrypractices-and-consumers-expectations&catid=129:subcommittee-on-commerce-tradeand-consumer-protection&Itemid=70) (“House Ad Hearings”)
2 See Google Corporate Information,
http://www.google.com/corporate/).
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Section III discusses the way in which the rise of the Internet is
disrupting the prior business model for selling content through its
destruction of the integrity of the copy. This is forcing a move
away from selling copies towards attaching advertising to content
that will be distributed for free anyway. As we move to relying on
advertising, content itself will change. Section IV of the paper
plays through a simple model of advertising as matching. It
demonstrates in a simple framework that sellers will do too little
advertising and buyer advertising—voluntary disclosures of
information—helps to push closer to the socially-desired level of
advertising. Technologies that reduce the cost of matching buyers
and sellers—think eBay, Craigslist, Facebook and Google and
other search engines—make buyers and sellers better off as they
improve the likelihood of making a successful match. Finally,
Section V offers a more detailed examination of the institutional
features of online advertising, identity and privacy.
I. The New Computing Platform: Web 2.0 and the
Cloud
We are once again changing how we use computers. In the past,
we moved from mainframes to mini computers to freestanding
personal computers. That was a powerful shift in control and
organizational structure. Mainframes were rare and were treated as
such, tended to with loving care and serviced by a small caste of
computing priests. PCs, in contrast, were everywhere: on every
knowledge worker’s desk and eventually in the family room of
many homes. Full decentralization. In the PC age, the computer
desktop was the most valuable real estate around, and, for most
people, that meant Microsoft Windows.
We should start with desktop computing before the emergence
of the Internet. Microsoft Office—Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint
and Word—set the standard for desktop productivity tools. These
were the tools that we used to create documents that resided on the
hard disks in our desktops or laptops. Outlook was used to manage
calendar, contacts and email. The CPUs in our computers churned
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away to do the calculations in an Excel spreadsheet or to format a
document in Word. These documents were then distributed, on
paper or via email, to be read by the recipients.
Now think about what you use your computer for today. In this
new era, we might think of matching and coordination as being
the defining tasks we expect software to perform. eBay is explicitly
about creating a marketplace to match buyers and sellers. Craigslist
matches everything under the sun: buyers and sellers to be sure and
job seekers galore, but also personals and house swaps, lost and
found items and rideshares. Social networking sites like mySpace
and Facebook match individuals to define old and new social
networks. Google matches people looking for content with the
websites where that content is stored. And Twitter has emerged as
a micro-blogging platform or more of a connected microbroadcasting format. Individuals subscribe to the tweets—140character messages—of people that they find interesting and can in
turn send out tweets to individuals who have signed up to follow
them.
This is the emergence of a new class of online intermediaries.
They typically operate over the Internet through a Web browser.
They can charge transaction fees like eBay or charge for a job
posting like Craigslist. Given the number of pageviews that take
place, the intermediary can support all of the content with
advertising as Google does. Given the ready ability to match
advertising with content, a platform that generates pageviews is a
valuable media property.
But there is more. The intermediary has the ability to see what
is happening with every click and this creates an incredibly rich
clickstream.3 eBay may be able to figure out whether I am more of
a Cubs fan than a White Sox fan and how much I like Pokémon.
Google has an even deeper knowledge of my interests, as I search
far more often than I buy or sell on eBay. Google stores cookies on
the computers of individual users and through the cookie
3 John Battelle, The Search (Portfolio, 2005).
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accumulates information about my interests. In Google’s case, for
the most part, Google’s information about me is associated with
the particular browser that I use.
Visit Google in two different guises, first using your standard
browser and then again using a virginal browser.4 For me, I use
Google Chrome as my basic browser; I never use Opera—or opera
for that matter—except to run tests. The Google Opera-version of
me, in Sergeant Schultz like fashion, knows nothing: no interests
are listed for me and the browser reports that no doubleclick.net
“id” cookie is installed for Opera-me. In contrast, Google believes
that Chrome-me is interested in business; finance and insurance;
news and current events: newspapers; and so on and a very lengthy
cookie is associated with Chrome-me browsing.5
But search is the core of Google’s business but search need not
rely on identity to be useful. Google’s original approach to search
focused on links across websites to assess relevance. Search also is
fundamentally a law-of-large-numbers business: the search engine
knows how to respond to your request based on how other
searchers have responded to similar requests in the past. The
search engine can learn what is and is not relevant based on the
clicks it observes. That need not be tied to identity at all. Google
does offer a version of personalized search tied to identity which
promises to deliver tailored results based on past search and sites
visited, but that requires a Google separate account and you need
not have one to search on Google.6
But many Web 2.0 products turn on identity. Not Opera-me
or Chrome-me, but directly on me me. Facebook and Twitter are
social networking programs, meaning that at their heart they turn
4 Go to http://www.google.com/ads/preferences/.
5 Google makes clear that while its customers can opt out of receiving interest-based

ads, opt-out is specific to a particular browser. If you use a different browser, you will
need to opt out again for that browser. See Google Advertising Privacy FAQ, How does
Google
use
cookies
to
serve
ads?
(online
at
http://www.google.com/privacy_ads.html#toc-faq).
6 www.google.com/psearch.
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on one-by-one direct links between users, Facebook’s home page
states that “Facebook helps you connect and share with the people
in your life.” That is exactly what it does. On Facebook, I have
direct links with my friends. A potential friend sends me a request
to validate that status. If I do so, I then see updates about my
friend’s life. Facebook has a dashboard of controls that let you
calibrate exactly how much information you broadcast to your
connections and to the world at large. For friend status, Facebook
operates on an opt-in basis: you aren’t my friend unless I say that
you are. Facebook has also expanded its privacy controls to make it
possible for users to calibrate more finely exactly how their
information is revealed.7
Twitter has a different approach to connections. Twitter is the
leading “microblogging” service or as Twitter puts it, “a service for
friends, family, and co-workers to communicate and stay
connected through the exchange of quick, frequent answers to one
simple question: What are you doing.” Users blast out tweets in
140-character units to their “followers.” Followers must opt in—I
can’t force you to pay attention to me—but you can follow me
without my permission (though I can subsequently block you if I
really don’t want you following me). This makes the service
asymmetric and in some notable cases highly so. Ashton Kutcher
(aplusk on twitter)—I could tell you who he is but I would have to
Google him to be sure—has over 2 million followers, while he
follows 169 people. Oprah has 1.5 million followers but only
follows 14.8 Put this way, Twitter sounds frivolous, but that would
be like blaming paper for People magazine. This are just
communication tools—and I do read People sometimes—but
amidst the turmoil in Iran in mid-2009, the U.S. State
Department asked Twitter to delay a service outage so that citizens
in Iran could continue to tweet.9
7 Facebook Press Release, Announcement: Facebook Updates Privacy Controls,

March 18, 2008 (online at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=24114).
8 Figures as of June 19, 2009.
9 Mark Landler and Brian, Stelter, Washington Taps Into a Potent New Force in
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But, again, both Twitter and Facebook depend on identity. I
connect to my friends and see tweets from the people I choose to
follow. If I don’t provide my Facebook identity or my Twitter
identity when I log onto those services, they are of much less use.
You don’t seem to be able to access Facebook without logging in—
the ultimate walled garden—and while you can search on Twitter
without logging in, its search function is still relatively week.
Both
Facebook
and
Twitter
are
a
substantial
information/privacy step beyond Google in that they both are best
used using actual identities. It makes very little sense to speak of
opting out of some version of identity on Facebook or Twitter.
You could operate under a pseudonym and there clearly are
circumstances under which you might want to do so—after all, The
Federalist Papers were written by Publius—but most users will be
on Facebook and Twitter in their actual identities.10
Users may want to calibrate with great precision what
information is shared with different users or limit particular uses of
information but fully anonymous use of Facebook or Twitter
would largely render the services useless. In contrast, I may be
delighted to search anonymously and indeed may prefer to search
anonymously, as my very searches may reveal a great deal about me
that I would prefer to keep private.
This is an important difference between Facebook and Twitter
and Google. Again, search is first and foremost a business of
intelligent aggregation across websites and largely anonymous
individuals. The finance model—advertising—works better if at
least pseudo-identity is established—browser-me—but the
business function itself—returning organic search results—works
with anonymous users. But actual identity is central to Facebook
and Twitter, plus the nature of the interactions on Facebook
encourages users to provide real information about their lives.
Diplomacy,
The
New
York
Times,
June
16,
2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/17media.html).

(online

at

10 The EU’s Article 29 Working Group would require social networking services to
allow pseudonyms. See Article 29 SNS Opinion, supra note 1, at 13.
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Switch to cloud computing. Computing power was originally
highly centralized with mainframes, and then we decentralized
through minicomputers and PCs. With the cloud, content and
computing power will increasingly be managed centrally.11 The
problem with owning a PC is that you are your own tech support
and most of us are getting lousy service. Computers are
complicated. Badly-run computers inflect harm on all of us, when
their power is harvested in botnets and computer spam is sent
across the globe. And PCs are lumpy: you buy computing power at
one time and not just when you need it.
It doesn’t have to work that way. Most people wouldn’t
consider for a second rolling their own electricity; they expect to
get it from a socket and want to rely on the local electricity
company to do the hard work that lies behind that. We may be
headed that direction on computing power, both for calculation
and storage. Some content may be stored locally on your machine,
while other content—content that you in some powerful sense
think belongs to you—will be stored remotely. Where actually?
You won’t have a clue.
Most people probably don’t have strong feelings about where
their computer calculations are done. Whether most of the
processing power exists locally in the device on your desktop or in
your hand is a detail. If communications costs have dropped
sufficiently such that we won’t notice when most of the computing
is done remotely and then delivered rapidly to our local devices, we
can return computing power to the center. This is really just an
engineering problem that turns on the relative cost of central and
local processing power and of distant and local—really local
meaning on the bus inside your computer—communication.
Important, to be sure, but not something most end-users will care
about.

11 Nicholas Carr, The Big Switch: Rewiring the World, From Edison to Google
(Norton, 2008).
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But that analysis is crucially dependent on an implicit
assumption, namely, that changing the location of processing or
storage doesn’t change anything about how the datastream
associated with processing or storage is used. Think of this as a
version of cloud neutrality: where processing or storage is done
should be irrelevant—neutral—for outcomes, legal or otherwise. If
instead my cloud provider monitored all of my spreadsheet
calculations and then tailored advertising to match what it had
gleaned from the calculations—“Looks like he’s looking for a
mortgage”—that would be a big change. The move to centralized
processing and storage creates communications traffic that can be
monitored.
Email is a good example. I have a separate email application
(Microsoft Outlook) that I use to download email messages and
store those on my laptop. I also have an email account through
Google (Gmail) which I manage through a web browser. That
email is stored remotely with Google and Google dutifully notifies
me of how much of “my” storage space at Google that I have filled
up. I paid cash for Outlook—more exactly, the University of
Chicago has a site license with Microsoft—but I “pay” for Gmail
by being exposed to the advertisements that it places on the far
right edge of the screen. Google runs my email through a filter to
determine which ads I should see.
A cloud structure necessarily means transactions that turn on
identity. If I write a poem on my typewriter, I don’t have to
somehow identify myself to my typewriter. I put the sheet of paper
in and type, no questions asked. If I type a poem on my laptop, I
don’t necessarily have to identify myself to my laptop, though it
may be wise to structure the transaction that way. My laptop may
or may not require a password to be entered to use it. This is just a
question of security where I may want to use a password login to
enhance my security against third parties who might gain access to
my laptop.
But the cloud depends fundamentally on an authenticated
identity. If I store my email or documents in the cloud, I need to
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verify my identity to the cloud provider to access the documents.
After all, I want my email and not yours. To get my email, I need
to identity myself to my cloud-based email provider. This is true of
cloud services generally. I use Google’s Reader program extensively
to manage RSS—real simple syndication—feeds. Think of this as a
subscription to a website. As the website is updated, it makes
available a list of those updates. The feed reader reaches out to get
those updates and provides them as a single integrated list. This of
this as a broadcasting model, where the feeder reader has been
tuned to the websites that a user selects.
All of this makes it straightforward to pay attention to many
websites without having to visit any of them. It also means that
how often the website adds new content is irrelevant. You might
get tired of visiting an infrequently-updated site and might drop it
completely. The cloud never gets tired and captures quickly new
content at even the most moribund website. But the core of this is
that I want updates on the sites that I have selected, not updates on
a random assortment of websites that I have no interest in. To use
Google Reader, I have to be logged in with my Google identity
and absent providing that identity the program is worthless.
II. Scale and Scope Limits and the Switch from
Products to Services
Microsoft Windows was—and is—both product and delivery
system. Product in the sense that Windows performed certain
functions that all operating systems perform. Windows tracks files,
sends data through ports for printing and tells your computer
screen how to display fonts and images. Basic stuff that we expect
of our operating systems. But Windows is more than that:
Window delivers software. Software delivery, especially before the
Internet, was difficult. A consumer might find the software preinstalled on a new PC. Or the consumer might go to a computer
store—remember those?—and plunk down her credit card and
walk out with a large, almost empty box, that had, buried within it
somewhere, a plastic CD with new software.
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But Microsoft could guarantee software delivery by just
incorporating the new software into Windows. With each new
release of Windows—as Windows moved down the development
path from Windows 3.1 to Windows 95 to 98 and on towards
Vista—Microsoft expanded the footprint of Windows. This was
not just a question of more megabytes; Windows got bigger
because it expanded its functionality and in doing so killed off
what had been separate markets in freestanding functions.
Including a product in the next version of Windows insured its
widespread distribution as each version of Windows quickly
expanded its market share.12
In some basic sense, Windows was fundamentally unbounded.
That is, there was no obvious boundary for the scope of functions
that might be embraced in Windows.13 This mattered most when
we introduced ubiquitous networks to link computers together to
create the Internet and the Web. The move to networked devices
created a possible inflection point, a point of churn and
competition as different firms sought the upperhand in the new
computing space. In his May, 1995 Internet Tidal Wave memo,
Bill Gates famously feared that Netscape would “commoditize the

12 Microsoft’s current dispute with the European Union over Internet Explorer is

precisely about how Windows delivers software. The EU wants Microsoft to include
competing browsers with Windows 7—so-called must carry—and then to offer a browser
ballot on first boot of the computer. The end user would then select a browser the first
time she turned on her computer. Microsoft has elected instead to not ship a browser at
all, a choice that the EU has expressed skepticism about. For discussion, see Charles
Forelle, EU Plans Fresh Strike on Microsoft, The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009;
Dave Heiner, Working to Fulfill our Legal Obligations in Europe for Windows 7, June
11,
2009
(online
at
http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/06/11/working-to-fulfillour-legal-obligations-in-europe-for-windows-7.aspx); Associated Press, E.U. Criticizes
Microsoft
Plan
to
Remove
Browser,
June
12,
2009
(online
at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/06/12/technology/AP-EU-EUMicrosoft.html).
13 See Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for

Centralized Coordination in a Networked World, 158 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ
113 (2002); Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We
Invest in Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U Chi L Rev 189 (2005).
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underlying operating system.”14 Windows was going to become
plumbing, important to be sure, but fundamentally anonymous and
only noticed when it wasn’t working right. Microsoft moved
aggressively against Netscape and relied heavily on its ability to
bundle Internet Explorer with Windows at no additional charge to
defeat Netscape. Microsoft won its battle against Netscape, though
it did so in ways found to be illegal by competition authorities in
the United States.15
But Microsoft seems to be losing the larger war suggested by
the tidal wave. Gates also feared that a new platform would emerge
for accessing the Internet that would sidestep the PC itself: “One
scary possibility being discussed by Internet fans is whether they
should get together and create something far less expensive than a
PC which is powerful enough for Web browsing.”16 The shift that
Gates envisioned is now emerging with real force with cloud backends matched with smartphone and netbook front-ends. These
new devices—say Apple’s iPhone and iPod Touch platforms,
Google’s Android devices, the Palm Pre and netbooks—aren’t
PCs, but do much of the work that we want our devices to do
today.
The shift in the computing platform is working against
Microsoft powerfully. The current Web 2.0 market is dominated
by Google, Facebook and Twitter. End-users don’t pay to use
these services but instead “pay” for them through exposure to
advertising. And like Windows, an advertising-based infrastructure
has no obvious boundaries, other than the limits of advertising
itself. Focus on Google as the leader in this space. The Google

14

Bill Gates, The Internet Tidal Wave,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/20.pdf).

May

26,

1995

(online

at

15 United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F3d 34, 58 (DC Cir 2001) (en banc). The
European Union also found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in operating
systems, though the focus of the EU case was on interoperability with servers and the
bundling of Windows Media Player with Windows. See Microsoft Corp. v Commission of
the European Communities, Case T-201/04, Court of First Instance.
16 Gates, The Internet Tidal Wave, supra note 14, at 4.
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engine is in many ways more powerful than Microsoft’s. It isn’t
obvious how the size of Windows or how its functionality effected
the price that Microsoft could charge for Windows. When
Microsoft added browser functionality to Windows, it didn’t
necessarily increase the price of Windows. In contrast, Google’s
“price” scales up directly with each added service that it finances
through advertising. Google’s expansion model results in
additional revenue with each ad that is clicked. Like Windows,
Google’s business has no obvious boundaries. The limit seems to
be the content or services that can be supported by advertising and
might be as large as anything mediated by a display screen, but,
unlike Windows, Google’s revenue scales as more services are
added. Google’s limits are the limits of advertising itself.
III. Paying for Online Content and Services
The emergence of the Internet and a broadband infrastructure have
radically decentralized the opportunities to create and distribute
content. There has never been a better time to be a new, unknown
creator. Before the Internet, the high cost of distribution meant
that gatekeepers limited how much content could reach the public.
Those gatekeepers would have a strong incentive to select content
that would succeed financially, but the high failure rate for new
content makes clear that gatekeeping is hard work. Nobody knows is
the operative principle in Hollywood,17 and if that is right, we
should welcome a strong drop in creation and distribution costs so
that gatekeeping becomes much less important. Don’t guess in the
dark; instead put something on YouTube and see how the public
reacts to it. Lower costs means we can sort after the fact and not
rely on gatekeepers to do so before the fact.
But this drop in distribution costs has had a second
consequence: the copy itself is no longer a reliable mechanism for
organizing payment for the work. For most of the history of
content, built-in technological limitations of the media of

17 See Richard E. Caves, Creative Industries 3 (Harvard 2000).
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distribution meant that publication brought with it certain control
over content. For a consumer, books, movies and recorded music
were hard to copy and even harder to distribute in large numbers.
The Internet has changed this. To possess a copy of a work—
especially a digital copy—is to have the power of distribution in
your hands. For a creator, to sell a single copy of a work is to sell
the practical ability to distribute content for free. Sold once, free
everywhere.
With the death of the copy, we are losing our ability to
organize paying for content. The sold copy has represented a
simple way of organizing consumers to pay for content. When
consumers pay for content, they are the patrons served by content
producers. If consumers don’t pay for content, the advertisers are
the patrons and it is their interests that will be served. Sold once,
free everywhere is a world in which volunteers pay for content and
we may find it quite difficult to organize users to pay for content.
Organize is the operative word. The copy, sold and paid for, has
served as that organizing device, but in a world of instantaneous
free distribution, consumers/users will lose voice, as a group, and
advertisers will be heard instead.
That overstates, but if lose the ability to sell copies reliably, we
will need to abandon sales of content. We will be relegated to a
world of free, advertising-supported content. For ad-supported
content, we don’t need to figure out a way to get consumers to
hand over cash for a copy of the content. Ad-supported content
carries with it its own payment and sharing the content on p2p
systems doesn’t change that. Advertising-supported content may
be given away for free—sheet music years ago and broadcast TV
and radio today—and that reduces the need to control what
happens to copies. Making another copy just spreads the
advertising to another potential buyer (though the history of cable
TV shows that this is much more complicated). So if sold once,
free everywhere means that no one will pay for content, we will
need to add advertising to that content.
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But that will change content itself. Ad-supported content is
sold, but the purchasers aren’t the users, the purchasers are the
advertisers. Content that the advertisers don’t like—often
controversial, edgy content—won’t get purchased. Advertisers also
don’t care about reaching all consumers; they only want to reach
the consumers who can afford to plunk down money for their
products. The content that they will pay for will be tailored to the
demographics that the advertisers want to reach.
Content creates an audience, and it is that audience that is sold
to advertisers. The size and characteristics of an audience in turn
determine the advertisers who will match with it. Specialized
magazines—magazines like Bicycling or Sailing—define different
audiences than magazines like Sports Illustrated or the Economist. A
bike advertiser may be crowded out of a general purpose magazine.
Each ad in a magazine reaches all of the publication’s customers.
The publication’s audience is bundled together and can’t be offered
to advertisers in more narrowly defined slices. An ad for a bike may
only match one reader in a hundred in Sports Illustrated, and if so,
the ad has been wasted on the other 99 customers. The expected
return on an ad in a particular medium depends on the number of
interested customers that will be reached, the value of the
advertiser of each customer and of course the cost of an ad.
We want to create content to maximize the efficiency of the
ads. In many ways, that is an exercise in matching content and ads.
If content can be described in only the most general terms
possible—males 25-44—then we should expect to match those
characteristics with advertising for widely used products (beer, cars,
cell phones and the like). The more that the audience consuming
content can be narrowly defined the greater the extent to which we
can allow more specialized products to be matched with that
content.
Those basic notions don’t change as we move from traditional
advertising to online advertising, but the technology does create
new opportunities. Search engines create content on the fly and
then match it with highly-targeted ads. This matching process
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creates millions—billions?—of content niches where none existed
before. Look through the magazine racks at a Borders or Barnes &
Noble. It looks like every interest under the sun is covered, but
then step back and thing about the searches that you run and the
ads that are matched with them. The magazine rack covers a only a
narrow slice of the content universe, but search is an infinitely and
almost instantaneously scalable means of creating new content
niches.
We can easily do ad personalization on the Internet, and this is
its shining advantage over traditional advertising media. The
newspapers that show up on front stoops every morning tailor to
the readership of the newspaper but only crudely. The ads in The
Wall Street Journal aren’t the same ads that show up in the Chicago
Tribune, but neither newspaper has ads that are tailored to me.
This is true of magazines, billboards, television and radio. Ads in
these media are targeted to rough demographics. The Internet, in
contrast, promises advertising matched to me.
IV. A Matching Model of Advertising
I need to situate advertising. In one approach, advertising is
inefficient: businesses use advertising to try to steal customers, but,
in equilibrium, no customers move and the advertising dollars are
just thrown away. Assume, for example, that without advertising,
the firms would be indistinguishable and would split the market.
One firm can believes it can gain an advantage over the second by
advertising and thereby divert customers. That might work if only
one firm advertised, but if both firms advertise, the advertising will
offset. The firms will still split the market but will do so with
higher costs.
While there is undoubtedly some merit to this prisoner’s
dilemma view of advertising, in this section, I want to pursue a
different path. Advertising will facilitate matches between sellers
and buyers. Sellers and buyers have trouble finding each other and
advertising improves the likelihood of a match. Sellers won’t
compete with each other—the premise of the prisoner’s dilemma
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approach to advertising—but instead will sell to consumers if they
can match with them successfully. In this model, advertising
increases the probability of a successful match. But, and this is the
key point, if the gains from a successful match are split, sellers will
underinvest in advertising. That is, they will select a level of
advertising that takes into account their gains from a successful
match but the sellers will ignore the benefits of a match that flow
to the consumer. We will get too little advertising.
How we do we solve that? Consumers should advertise.
Consumers could buy ads on the Super Bowl—well, not at $2.6
million for thirty seconds—but when consumers reveal information
to potential sellers, consumers are facilitating the matches that I
have in mind. In turning over information—in giving up some part
of their privacy—consumers are advertising. That advertising is
useful precisely because it helps to facilitate good seller/buyer
matches and is necessary given that sellers themselves will do too
little advertising.
Of course, this is as friendly a conception of advertising as
possible. How consumers experience advertising depends on
context. Radio and TV ads are frequently irritating and we quickly
surf away from those ads. Ads in those media fully displace at least
temporarily our access to the content that we are actually interested
in. Ads in other media are often less intrusive and the consumer
can easily select how much time to spend with an ad, as I do when
I read a newspaper or magazine. A more general conception of
advertising would need to take into account both the manner in
which sellers can compete for sales and the possible disutility of
advertising, but in this section, I want to focus on how advertising
facilitates matches between buyers and sellers.
A. Advertising by Sellers
Start with a simple conception of advertising as facilitating
matches between consumers and sellers across different
marketplaces. For a particular type of product, we have one
potential seller and one potential buyer and they need to
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coordinate over two different marketplaces. If our transacting pair
coordinate on the same marketplace, a deal takes place, but
otherwise not. Understand of course that this framing means that
there is no competition between the sellers. One seller can’t drive
sales away from another seller. This is a case where the parties
want to coordinate successfully and have no stake in blocking some
other match.
Without advertising, assume that each participant chooses a
marketplace at random. That means that we have a 25% chance of
a successful match in marketplace 1 and the same in marketplace 2.
Half the time they fail to coordinate: the seller is in market 1,
while the buyer is in market 2 or vice versa. Next introduce
advertising. Start with a simple conception: advertising increases
the probability of a successful match. In the framework so far, treat
advertising as increasing market presence so that a seller who
advertises is able, probabilistically, to be in more than one market
at once. So treat advertising as a variable that ranges from 0 to 1
and let psi be the probability that the seller is in market i. Set psi = ½
+ ½a. Be clear on what this is and isn’t. This isn’t that the seller
can advertise to raise the probability that it is in market 1 rather
than market 2. Instead, if the seller bought the maximum amount
of advertising—set a = 1—the seller would be guaranteed a match
with the buyer. With a = 1, the seller would have a probability of
being in market 1 of 1 and a probability of being in market 2 of 1.
Half the time the consumer would appear in market 1 and a deal
would be struck; half the time the consumer would go to market 2
and a deal would also be struck. Advertising allows the seller to
increase market presence.
Before we specify the cost of advertising, we should say what
we can now. Advertising will be socially valuable because it will
make beneficial transactions more likely. Buyers and sellers can’t
find each other, or, more precisely, can only do so probabilistically,
and advertising can boost those probabilities. We will also have, in
this framework, less advertising than we would like socially. So far
I haven’t specified the content of what “advertising” is. That will be
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important eventually, but for now think of advertising as we
usually do, meaning information provided by the seller to improve
the chance of a deal with a buyer.
I will start with an arbitrary and rigid division of the benefits of
a successful deal. A successful deal will create a net benefit of V to
the parties; s fraction of the will go the seller and b fraction to the
buyer. Maybe that is specified by a broader framework in which
buyers and sellers can rematch and the overall numbers of buyers
and sellers determine the balance of power, the kinds of deals that
are struck and the resulting division of the benefits, but I will just
impose them.
Given that arbitrary and rigid division of the benefits of a
successful deal, the seller will underinvest in advertising. There will
be too few ads. Sellers will calculate their ad spends based on the
benefits to them of making a deal. They will ignore the benefits to
the buyer from the successful deal. So sellers will bear the full costs
of the ads but will only get part of the benefits, hence there will be
too little advertising.
We can play with a little model to see that more sharply, but
ultimately the model won’t do more than just illustrate the point
made. Choose a simple form for how much it costs to advertise:
(1)
We should calculate the socially optimal level of a, the level
that the seller will actually choose and then the gap between the
two. The social optimum is determined by maximizing:
-

(2)

Recall that the consumer effectively just flips a coin in choosing
between markets 1 and markets 2. In the pure market coordination
game without advertising, both markets are Nash equilibria and
one market isn’t preferred over the other, so the consumer has no
real basis for choosing a market. Introducing advertising doesn’t
change that either, since in this specification, advertising raises the
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seller’s presence in both markets simultaneously, so our consumer
still flips coins.
If we substitute for ps1 and ps2 in 2, we then get:
-

(3)

In contrast, the seller chooses a to maximize:
-

(4)

Again, substitute in the functional forms for market presence
with advertising we get:
-

(5)

With a little work, we can see that the socially optimal level of
advertising is given by:
(6)
And the private optimum for the seller is given by:
(7)
We can see that those are identical if s = 1, meaning that the
seller receives all of the benefits of the trade. Even a monopolist
creates social surplus that it can’t capture, unless it is able to price
discriminate perfectly. Otherwise the privately-chosen level of
advertising is just the social optimum multiplied by the seller’s
share of the gains from trade. Again, that confirms what we knew
at the beginning: unless the seller receives the full social benefit of
spending that increases the probability of a successful match, the
seller will underinvest in advertising.
B. Advertising by Consumers
How do we move forward from the gap? In this framework,
consumers should advertise. That is, consumers should invest in
trying to match successfully with sellers. Consumers benefit too
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from a successful match. Does this means that consumer should be
buying time on network TV? They could, but the more tractable
place to start is with consumer information and privacy. There is
obviously a great deal wrapped up in the notion of privacy, but a
relevant notion here is that consumers should want to reveal
information to sellers to facilitate matches. When a consumer gives
up information voluntarily to a potential seller, we should think of
a consumer as engaging in advertising. Reveal information to
advertise.
We can run through a similar, but more complex, formulation
when the buyer can advertise too. Assume that the buyer has access
to a similar matching/advertising technology. The gains from trade
arise as before, meaning only when the buyer and seller successfully
coordinate on the right market. The social optimum is determined
from:
-z

-z

(8)

where
and
This allows for the possibility that the seller and the buyer have
different costs of advertising. The socially-optimal levels of
advertising are then given by:
V
V

V

and

V

(9)

We can then substitute the optimal levels of advertising to find
overall welfare given the optimal levels of advertising:
V
V

(10)

Differentiating that with respect to z makes clear that as z
increases overall welfare drops. That is to be expected: an increase
in z means that advertising is becoming more expensive and that in
turn means that it harder for sellers and buyers to match
successfully.
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Now switch to consider the separate decisions of the seller and
buyer. The seller and the buyer choose their separate levels of
advertising in the Nash equilibrium determined by maximizing
their private returns:
-

(11)

-

(12)

and

Working with the generalized divisions of the gains from
trade—b and s—leads to messy formulations and makes it harder
to see how the Nash case compares to the optimum result. To
simplify, assume that the gains from trade are split evenly, meaning
that b = s = ½. Then the Nash levels of advertising are given by:
a

V
V

and a

V
V

(13)

As expected, these are lower levels of advertising than we would
like socially, and, as before, if we do a little additional work, we can
see that private welfare levels increase as the cost of advertising
decreases. Lower advertising costs increases advertising and here
that raises the probability of a successful match. Buyers and sellers
should welcome a mechanism that reduces the costs of making a
successful match.
V. Managing Identity and Privacy
Identity and anonymity are tricky notions. Part of our new
computing architecture is precisely about how identities are
constructed and controlled.
A. The Role of Identity
Look at five examples of this architecture to get a sense of the rich
choices available.
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1. EBAY AND CONSTRUCTED IDENTITY

eBay is an early example of constructed identity and disputes over
the ownership, portability and management of that identity. eBay
and Craigslist killed newspapers. That overstates—both as to cause
and result—but nonetheless is importantly accurate. Both eBay
and Craigslist made classified ads less important. eBay created a
national market in used goods and did so by constructing
identities. eBay mediates transactions between strangers.
Coordination and matching are standard Web 2.0 functions and
eBay matched buyers with sellers. As eBay built up a critical mass,
its momentum became self-fulfilling: sellers wanted to sell where
buyers would be, and vice versa of course. Transactions between
strangers at a distance is a long-standing problem in commercial
law. As a purchaser, how can I determine whether my prospective
seller will deliver the listed item? eBay users build up a reputation
score transaction by transaction—a score tied to an eBay identity—
and that identity help to mitigate the problem of transactions at a
distance between strangers.
But the eBay identity system also has important competitive
consequences. Since the reputation accumulates prior transactions,
a competing auctions entrant starts with an immediate
disadvantage. eBay’s reputation system is sticky, or, put differently,
it creates switching costs. A long-time seller on eBay has a
reputation that she has built up carefully. But if she switches to the
entrant, she will be a newbie again and buyers will naturally be
reluctant to transact with her. But there is a ready solution: make
the eBay identity and reputation portable. eBay’s user agreement
bars this in an attempt to use the constructed identity to limit
competition with eBay by new auction entrants.18
18 See eBay, Your User Agreement (“While using eBay sites, services and tools, you

will not: … take any action that may undermine the feedback or ratings systems (such as
displaying, importing or exporting feedback information off of the sites or using it for
purposes unrelated to eBay); transfer your eBay account (including feedback) and User
ID
to
another
party
without
our
consent;
…
.”)
(online
at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html). I discuss these issues in
greater detail in Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud,

Monday, June 29, 2009

Page 25

Randal C. Picker

Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy

2. GOOGLE AND SEARCH: THE ROLE OF IDENTITY

Consider the following figure to understand the role that identity
plans in Google’s search business. As that figure suggests, Google
effectively operates its search business in four identity locations:

Advertising Use of
Identity

Identity Revelation and Google Search

Anon Search
Browser-Me Ads (Opt Out)
Anon Search
Anon Ads (Contextual Only)

Personalized Search (Bundled
Opt In)
Browser-Me Ads (Opt Out)

Personalized Search (Bundled
Opt In)
Anon Ads (Contextual Only)

Organic Search Results Use of Identity

Google classic, as it were, is the lower-left quadrant:
anonymous organic search results and anonymous ads. Focus first
on how Google might use the datastreams that arise in search.
Search is an exercise in relevance: for any search term presented,
the search engine wants to return the “best” matches. How should
we assess best? Brin and Page’s original search patent is for their
PageRank algorithm. That algorithm looks to the link structure of
the web to measure importance and therefore relevance.19 If we are
103
Nw.
U.L.
Rev.
Colloquy
1
(2008)
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/25/).

(online

at

19 For a basic description, see Our Search: Google Technology (online at
http://www.google.com/technology/).

Monday, June 29, 2009

Page 26

Randal C. Picker

Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy

looking for information about the Chicago Cubs, if many pages
link to a particular page about the Cubs, we might conclude that
that is a particularly relevant page. The PageRank approach
emphasizes information that is available publicly. Any entrant
could do the same, at least if they could do so consistent with the
original patent. Note also that none of this is tied to the identity of
the person running the search. All of this can be done with fully
anonymous users.
That version of search doesn’t rely on the datastreams that arise
in search. But we might imagine an approach which does so and
which relies more directly on collective intelligence. Focus on how
searchers respond to the presented search results. If searchers
routinely reject the first listed item for the second, we would be
learning something about the perceived relevance of the results.
That approach, multiplied over many users and an almost infinite
number of searches, would create a system that learns and evolves
in response to what users are doing.20 If that learning improved
relevance, more searchers would seek to rely on the system, and
that in turn would generate more learning. That in turn generates a
positive feedback loop and should operate as a barrier to entry.
Unlike the page-link information at the heart of PageRank which
relies on publicly observable data, learning through search results
relies on private information available only to the search engine.
But this still doesn’t rely on identity. This is an exercise in the
law of large numbers: see enough cases and the search engine can
learn how different searches correlate with desired responses. It is
not an exercise that says that for searcher 721, football means
soccer and not American football. Personalized search promises
exactly that but that must be tied to identity. That takes us to the
lower right quadrant of the figure. For Google, at least, a user
cannot have personalized search absent a Google Account, so in
that sense, Google personalized search is opt in. But in setting up a
Google Account, a new user must opt out of personalized search;
20 See Hal Varian, Why data matters, Mar 4,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-data-matters.html).
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absent doing so, the new account holder is defaulted in to
personalized search.21 I call this bundled opt-in in the figure. Your
Google account will be at least a pseudo-identity and may be close
to an actual identity, as it is my case (meaning that it contains my
actual name along with stored transaction information (two test
videos bought from Google when it was running its failed Google
Video service)). Google is more careful with personalized search,
requiring more frequent log in.22
But we have just been focusing on the search side of search.
Organic search results are matched with advertising. Advertising
need not turn on some version of identity but advertising is more
useful—both for the advertiser and for the content-consumer—if,
as discussed in Section III, the advertising is actually relevant to
the user. The datastream could also be used to match the ads
presented next to the organic search results with the searcher, socalled behavioral advertising. John Wanamaker, the department
store magnate, famously observed that he wasted half of the money
that he spent on advertising, but “I don’t know which half.”23 And
Wanamaker may have been optimistic. Think about TV
advertising and how many ads that you see for products that you
never consume. Those ads are almost all wasted. Behavioral
advertising offers the promise of tailoring ads to individual
consumers greatly increasing the efficiency of each ad dollar spent.
Google uses a number of tools to increase ad relevance, some of
which turn on some version of identity and some of which don’t.24
21 www.google.com/psearch and www.google.com/accounts/.
22 As Google notes in its description of personalized search, “[t]o help protect your

privacy, we’ll sometimes ask you to verify your password even though you’re already
signed in. This may happen more frequently for services like Web History which involves
your personal information.” The sign-in for the Web History service embeds by default
my Google Account email address, but it does not embed my password for that account
and also leaves blank the box that will cause Google to “remember me on this computer
for Web History.”
23 See John Wanamaker (1838-1922), The Advertising Century (online at

http://adage.com/century/people006.html).
24 This discussion is based on Google’s description in the Google Privacy Center of
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Unsurprisingly, Google displays ads based upon the content of the
search and this puts us in the lower half of the figure. A search on
“Honda Odyssey” returns different ads than a search on “Toyota
Sienna.” This isn’t about identity, it is just about the content of the
search terms themselves. Google also displays ads based upon the
content of visited websites. As Google notes, gardening websites
will likely have ads about gardening. Again, this is tied to content
and context, not identity.
Take stock on where we are so far. Google runs, as it were, a
generic anonymous search service and a personalized search service.
The latter requires a Google Account and thus at least a pseudo
identity. Google matches ads with searches and can do that with
context-only anonymous ads. Be clear: I mean anonymous in the
sense that any searcher running the search would seem the same
ads for the same search. The search content matters for the ads but
not the identity of the searcher. This is the bottom half of the
figure and whether we are in the lower-left quadrant or the lowerright quadrant depends on whether a searcher is running
personalized search.
But Google also serves ads based on my interests as identified
by Google through cookies and this is the top half of the figure.
Again, this isn’t necessarily my actual identity or a pseudonym but
instead my browser-identity as tracked by the cookies that Google
stores on my computer. Google calls these “interest-based” ads,
plus Google makes it possible to display ads to users based upon
their previous visits to a website. All of this is tied to the cookie
that Google stores—defining my browser identity—but not
necessarily my actual identity.25 Google seems to run its interestbased advertising on an opt out basis, meaning that a user will
receive interest-based ads—and have her interests tracked—unless
she takes an affirmative step to prevent this from happening.26
Advertising and Privacy (online at http://www.google.com/privacy_ads.html).
25 I haven’t actually tested that you can do both personalized search and anonymous

ads simultaneously.
26 See Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc., “Giving consumers
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It is important not to be confused by the size of the boxes in
the figure. Google introduced interest-based ads in March, 200927
so the top half of the figure didn’t even exist until then. I am aware
of no public figures on opt-in or opt out of personalized search at
Google, though do remember that you can’t be in personalized
search if you don’t have a Google account. My guess is that most
of Google’s history has taken place in the lower-left quadrant.
Note one other point in passing about the richness of the
approaches to opt in and opt out. You have to have a Google
account established to do personalized search. When you set up a
new account with Google,28 the Web History feature that enables
personalized search is set up to default to on—opt out—but you
just need to check a box to opt out. In contrast, to opt out of new
interest-based advertising, you need to go look through Google’s
website to find the right spot to opt out.
3. FACEBOOK: 200 MILLION REAL IDENTITIES29

There are a number of social networks, including Facebook and
mySpace, plus any number of niche networks, such as LinkedIn
which looks to organize business and professional connections.
These networks are organized around the notion that individuals
will connect with other individuals and will do so by providing real
control over ads,” Google Public Policy Blog, March, 2009 (“With one click in the Ads
Preferences Manager or in the advertising section of our privacy center, users can opt out
of
interest
based
ads
altogether
…
”)
(online
at
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/03/giving-consumers-control-overads.html). This behavior may vary across browsers. If I visit the Ad Preferences Manager
in Opera, I need to click a button to affirmatively opt in to the interest-based ads.
27 See Testimony of Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc., House

Ad Hearings supra note 1, at p5 (“Wong Testimony”) (online
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_wong.pdf).

at

28 https://www.google.com/accounts/NewAccount.
29 As of June, 2009, Facebook had roughly 200 million active users, with 65 million

based in the United States. See Testimony of Chris Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer,
Facebook, House Ad Hearings, supra note 1, at p1 (online at
(“Kelly
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_kelly.pdf)
Testimony”). I have not seen a breakdown of actual identity usage versus usage through a
pseudonym.
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information about themselves. I’ll focus on Facebook to choose just
one, mainly because it seems to have an edge in momentum.
Facebook is organized around actual identities as its own
online space. You must log in to use Facebook though Facebook
has gradually made it possible for outsiders to Facebook to see
limited profiles of Facebook members, subject to override through
its detailed privacy settings.30 You make connections with other
Facebook members. One person has to initiate the transaction: will
you be my Facebook friend? You will see that request on your
Facebook home page, plus you get an email with notice of the
friend request.
You then have to decide whether to accept the request.
Sometimes your response will be immediate: you are just carrying
over a friendship from one space to Facebook’s virtual space. But in
other cases, you may not have any real clue who the person is, at
least not until you click over to the person’s Facebook profile. Here
is where actual identities come in. If you have been out of high
school more than I’ll guess a decade some fraction of your
Facebook friend requests will be from former classmates. When
you fill out your profile on Facebook, you can list exactly where
you went to school and when you graduated. Pull out an old
yearbook and you may even be able to map the high school picture
to the pixels that Facebook is presenting to you. Real identity is the
currency of authenticity. We went to high school together and you
want to reconnect on Facebook? That is probably enough for most
people but absent the profile, you very well might not establish a
connection with that individual.
Facebook is ultimately competing for a fraction of your
mediated time. You can only spend so much time in front of the
screens and even if you multiscreen—notebook on lap in front of
the TV with iPod Touch in arm’s reach—you have to make
choices.

30 See Philip Fung, Public Search Listings on Facebook, The Facebook Blog,
September 5, 2007 (online at http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=2963412130).
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Facebook is free to users. It displays ads on the pages it
presented to and thus is, like Google, another ad-supported
medium. And like Google, Facebook seeks to provide targeted ads.
Unlike Google, Facebook is working off information directly
provided by its users. As Facebook puts it in its privacy policy: “if
you put a favorite movie in your profile, we might serve you an
advertisement highlighting a screening of a similar one in your
town. But we don’t tell the movie company who you are.”31 As to
individual users, Facebook and Google may be in different
businesses—respectively, social networking and search—but as to
many advertisers paying the bills, they are competing with each
other in providing targeted advertising. Both Facebook and
Google provide targeted advertising platforms. Facebook’s is tied
to actual identities, Google’s to, in the main, browser-identity.
Take that idea and build a quadrant map for Facebook akin to
the one built for Google above. You can’t really speak of purely
anonymous use of Facebook: its core function is precisely about
matching people with different identities. If I am right in thinking
that most individuals participate on Facebook using their actual
identities, there really is no left-hand side of the Facebook identity
map. And Facebook’s privacy policy and its discussion of
advertising suggests that Facebook is mainly an upper-right
quadrant company. Remember that Google has been, for most of
its life, a lower-left quadrant company. Google’s move into
interest-based advertising means that Facebook and Google are
now much more squarely competitors.32
4. TWITTER: IDENTITY MAGNIFIED

Twitter is at still an early stage (I write as of June, 2009) but it is
enjoying extraordinary growth.33 Meaningful participation in
31 Facebook Privacy Policy (online at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php).
32 Fred Vogelstein makes a version of this point as well. See Fred Vogelstein, The
Great Wall of Facebook, Wired, July, 2009, p.96.
33 See Jay Yarow, Twitter’s Natural Monopoly, Silicon Alley Insider, April 8, 2009
(online at http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-twitters-natural-monopoly-
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Twitter requires an identity on Twitter but that need not be my
actual identity. But if Twitter really is best thought of as a
microblogging service or a micro-broadcasting platform, we can
expect large numbers of users to want to use their actual identities.
Take two examples of people I follow on Twitter: Steven Levy
(stevenjayl on Twitter) and Tim O’Reilly (timoreilly) of the geek
publishing empire bearing his name. For both of them, Twitter is
an extension of their preexisting personalities into a new space
where they can attract direct, unintermediated followers.
Unintermediated, meaning in Levy’s case, not through his position
as Senior Editor at Newsweek. That vision tracks early empirical
research on Twitter finding that 10% of the users do 90% of the
Tweeting.34 A few loud voices and many listeners.
There will be issues of course. If Twitter is so far an exercise in
connected identities and joint conversations, Twitter will have to
manage identity authenticity—how do I know that it the real Tony
La Russa, manager of the St. Louis Cardinals doing the tweeting
and not an impostor?35—but that is just a question of proof.
Unsurprisingly, Twitter is beta testing a Verified Account service
precisely to ensure identity authenticity.36 But Twitter matters now
both as a successful startup attracting individuals who are using
their real identities—a key step as a possible targeted advertising
platform—but also because of the way in which Twitter provides a
distinctive handle for real-time search. Not what Google saw when
it last visited a website, but what is happening now.37
2009-4).
34 Bill Heil and Mikolaj Piskorski, New Twitter Research: Men Follow Men and

Nobody
Tweets,
June
1,
2009
(online
http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/cs/2009/06/new_twitter_research_men_follo.html).

at

35 La Russa claimed that someone was pretending to be him on Twitter. See MG

Siegler, Hey There! Tony La Russa Is Suing Twitter, TechCrunch, June 4, 2009 (online
at http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/06/04/hey-there-tony-la-russa-is-suing-twitter/).
36 http://twitter.com/help/verified.
37 See Caroline McCarthy, Google execs admit Twitter’s winning real-time game,

cnet news.com, May 20, 2009 (online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-1024536136.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20); Steven Johnson, How Twitter Will
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5. GOOGLE’S IDENTITY-BASED CLOUD-SERVICES

Search, to be sure, is Google’s shining success story. As I described
before, search can be done largely anonymously and ads could be
presented solely based on content and context, meaning the
content of the particular search or the websites that are being
visited. That version of search isn’t tied to identity at all. Google
has extended that version of basic search in two directions and
both of those are tied to some version of identity. Personalized
search is tied to actual identity or a pseudonym that I have
established with Google, while interest-based ads require at least
browser-based identity.
Because search is relatively independent of identity, it sits in a
different space vis-à-vis its individual users than Facebook and
Twitter, both of which are based on at least pseudonym identity
and in many, many cases, actual identity. Facebook certainly thinks
of itself in terms of authenticity and trust38 and I suspect that that
is driven by the fact that its users use the service as themselves.
Much more than Twitter, Facebook users provide real information
about themselves. Not Google’s identified interest based on how I
search or surf the Web, but what I say matters to me. That raises
almost an interesting psychological question—is it what I say that
counts or what I actually do that really captures my interest?—but
Facebook has access to a distinct class of information tied to
identity that is separated off of what is accessible to Google.
But Google has a variety of services that are tied to at least
pseudo-identity. This is the basic nature of cloud-based services:
content that might be stored on my computer is stored somewhere
else. I need to authenticate my identity to get at my contents. In
the Google universe of services, that is certainly true for Google
Mail, Google Docs, Google Reader, Picasa Web Albums and
probably many other services.39
Change
the
Way
We
Live,
Time,
June
5,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1902604,00.html).

2009

(online

at

38 See Kelly Testimony, supra note 29, at p1.
39 See a list at http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/. Google contends that most
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And Google has moved directly into authenticated identity
with its Google Profile product.40 This appears to be a direct
competitor to Facebook. You create a profile of yourself with
Google. That profile requires at least some information that you
describe about yourself to be worthy of being displayed. That will,
as Google puts it, “[h]elp people find the right information when
they search for you on Google.” This suggests a tight link between
Google’s core search product and their profile product. Indeed,
Google states that your Google Profile will be displayed on the
results page of a web search in your name. Note that that is a
different approach to organic search results. It privileges a page
that might not otherwise appear on an early result screen. That is
not to say that the privileging is in some sense “wrong” as a selfcreated profile might be a particularly relevant response even if it
didn’t otherwise percolate to the top through Google’s standard
relevance measures. But this is a listing advantage that Google is
able to confer on its identity product. If you search on “Randy
Picker” on Google, the top organic result is the Law School’s bio
page for me. Google lists my Google Profile as the last search
result on the first page and then offers an additional line to search
for me on MySpace, Facebook, Classmates and LinkedIn.
B. Regulating Identity Controls
We are in the midst of a growing competition over identity and
privacy. The movement of content online—either by choice of the
copyrightholder or by choice of the user—has been associated with
a move to relying advertising as the means of paying for that
content. If the movement from offline to online continues or even
accelerates, online advertising will become even more important
and that will make targeted advertising a particular focus.
In the past, we have placed extensive controls on how
intermediaries can use the information that flows through their
hands. For example, the Cable Communications Policy Act of
of its products can be used without registering. See Wong Testimony, supra note 27, at 4.
40 http://www.google.com/profiles.
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1984 added privacy protections for consumers.41 The current
version of that statute requires written or electronic consent of
cable customers before the cable operator can use the cable system
to collect personally identifiable information about its customers.
But the statute also creates an exception to that rule allowing
collection of such information to detect cable theft and, more
generally, “to obtain information necessary to render a cable service
or other service provided by the cable operator to the subscriber.”42
Whether collecting information to implement behavioral
advertising will qualify under this safe harbor is an open question.
The cable statute also bars disclosure of personally identifiable
information to third parties, though, again, the statue exempts
disclosures “necessary to render, or conduct a legitimate business
activity related to, a cable service or other service provided by the
cable operator to the subscriber.”43
We are at an early stage in assessing how we will regulate
behavioral advertising. In the United States, the Federal Trade
Commission has undertaken a series of related inquiries into online
advertising culminating in a February, 2009 staff report.44 The
FTC has issued reports before on spyware and adware45 and has
launched actions against individual firms that the FTC believes
have engaged in deceptive practice in this space.46 Individual
members of Congress have suggested that more encompassing
41 PL 98-549, codified at 47 USC 551.
42 47 USC 551(b)(2)(A).
43 47 USC 551(c)(2)(A).
44 See FTC Behavioral Ads Report, supra note 1.
45 Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Monitoring Software on Your PC:
Spyware,
Adware,
and
Other
Software,
March
2005
(online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050307spywarerpt.pdf).
46 The FTC Behavioral Ads Report lists 23 such actions as of the date of the report,

see at 5 n8, and the FTC pursues actions in this area on an ongoing basis such as its
recent settlement regarding tracking software issued by a company jointly owned by Sears
and Kmart. See Federal Trade Commission Press Release, Sears Settles FTC Charges
Regarding
Tracking
Software,
June
4,
2009
(online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/sears.shtm).
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privacy legislation is appropriate, though it is hard to be certain
about the prospects for such legislation.47
The FTC’s report issued four non-binding principles to guide
self-regulation of behavioral advertising. In drafting those
principles, the report concluded that contextual advertising was
consistent with consumer expectations and therefore outside the
scope of the report. As I suggested above, contextual advertising
doesn’t turn on identity, as the same ads would be displayed tied to
a particular search or a particular website independent of the
identity of the consumer. There is no retention of information that
is somehow tied to the individual consumer. All of that suggests
that contextual advertising poses no identity or privacy issues
buttressing the FTC’s choice to exclude it from the principles.48
And remember, until March, 2009, Google only did contextual
advertising.
The FTC report also drew a line between first-party and thirdparty behavioral advertising, though exactly how that line was
drawn is unclear to me. The language of the report is to the point:
the definition of online behavioral advertising “is not intended to
include ‘first’ party’ advertising where no data is shared with third
parties.”49 The core notion there, says the FTC, is that first-party
usage matches much of what we anticipate will happen offline and
online as well.50 Back in the dawn of sales, my local merchant
knew me and knew what I purchased and I might rely on him for
recommendations. Amazon does that today, except with
remarkable efficiency.
Of course the utility of this doesn’t say anything about where
the default position should sit and whether firms should be
47 See Matthew Lasar, New Web privacy bill would make data sharing opt-in, ars

technical, May 6, 2009 (online at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/newweb-privacy-bill-would-make-data-sharing-opt-in.ars); Emily Steel, Web Privacy Efforts
Targeted, The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2009 p B10.
48 See FTC Behavioral Ads Report, supra note 1, at 46.
49 Id.
50 See FTC Behavioral Ads Report, supra note 1, at 26.
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required to offer a choice on a mandatory basis. The FTC expects
consumers to vote with their feet and switch to another firm if they
don’t like the choices that first-party providers are making about
data. That of course assumes a fair degree of meaningful
competition and it isn’t clear that that exists in market such as
search.
The other point of interest is what counts as data disclosure to
a third party and how that in turn effects firm incentives for firm
scope and size. For example, a disclosure limit of the sort seen in
the cable statute artificially pushes towards vertical integration. As
most disclosure limits don’t prevent disclosure within a particular
firm but only bar disclosure across firm boundaries, a firm will have
an artificial incentive to expand the size and scope of the firm so as
to use the information fully. Vertical integration renders the
disclosure limit ineffective. We might see mergers that would
otherwise be unattractive as a way to end-run the across-firm
disclosure limits.
Note also that disclosure may not be the act of relevance here.
If Google runs an ad placement service—of course it does:
AdSense51—it need not disclose any information to facilitate
matches between content and consumers. For Google’s paying
customers—its advertisers—the information will be in a black box.
These customers will be able to evaluate the click-through rates
that they are seeing from the use of the information controlled by
Google, but they need never see the information itself. No
disclosure, just use on their behalf. Indeed, as suggested before,
Google would almost certainly prefer not to disclose the
information, since disclosing the information gives up the control
that Google has from its exclusive access to the information.
Google does track sale completion from the original ad click and
disclosure of that information might trigger the FTC’s concerns
about disclosure to third parties.

51 https://www.google.com/adsense/login/en_US/.
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The FTC report itself largely sidesteps opt-in/opt out though
it generally favors consumer control over third-party tracking.52 It
is worth noting the contrast with the EU’s Article 29 Working
Group in its report on social networking sites. That report provides
that social networks should provide “privacy-friendly” default
settings and makes clear that in those settings that the “[d]ecision
to extend access may not be implicit, for example, with an ‘opt-out’
provided by” the social network.53
In assessing opt-in and opt-out, we need to focus on the
incentives of consumers and ability of service providers to provide
multiple versions of their service so as to induce meaningful
choices about opt-in and opt-out. Start with consumers and users.
One of the questions we will face in this space is to what extent
information revelation should be optional. Or to better track where
we are right now, to what extent should information revelation be
done on an opt-in or opt-out model? In the latter, consumers have
to be asked to reveal information. The cable act discussed above is
something of a hybrid: it clearly contemplates that consumers
should have to opt in, but also recognizes that full opt-in may be
inconsistent with how a service operates legitimately (for example,
controlling cable theft).
Opt-in and opt-out will suffer from across-consumer
externalities. Think about smoking and life insurance. I don’t
smoke and if I went to buy life insurance tomorrow, I would want
to disclose that fact to the insurance company. Insurance is priced
based on a pool of risks, and as a nonsmoker, I want to be placed
in a different pool than the smokers are in. But when I reveal that I
am not a smoker, I set in motion a chain of inferences which

52 See FTC Behavioral Ads Report, supra note 1, at 32 n.63 (“The proposed

Principles do not specify whether this choice would be opt-in or opt-out choice—just
that it be clear, easy-to-use and accessible to consumers”).
53 See Article 29 SNS Opinion, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted). Note also
that the opinion is focusing on control over the data and its collection without expressing
an opinion on online advertising. The working group intends to provide a separate
opinion on that subject. See id. at 9 n.19.
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should, on average, have the consequence of revealing that smokers
are smokers, even if they never say anything. This is a standard
result in information economics—we call it unraveling—and
creates what we might think of as a privacy externality: when I
reveal information about me, it has the consequence of revealing
something about you. My willingness to give up my privacy gives
up your privacy too. This will bite most often when one group
affirmatively wants to distance itself from a second group.
We might defend this in the smoking context on the notion
that absent the waiver of privacy by the nonsmokers, we get pooled
risks and non-smokers end up subsidizing the higher expected
insurance costs of smokers. Smokers therefore won’t fully
internalize the cost of smoking and we will have too many
smokers. Allowing nonsmokers to disclose information about their
nonsmoking then turns out to be socially valuable in the way that it
better channels the cost of smoking to smokers, but we need to
figure out how to account for, if at all, the privacy loss of the
smokers.
Now switch back from smoking to the more general setting of
consumer information revelation on the Internet to advertisers.
Focus on the incentives of advertising-based service providers and
then circle back to what that means for consumers. If each
consumer receiving free content pays the same advertising cost for
that content, then we should expect in equilibrium that the
expected click revenues for ads matched with content should be the
same for different consumers. Well-identified consumers will see
ads that match well with them and that in turn should increase the
chances that an ad will be clicked on. Anonymous consumers can’t
be matched; the only way to increase the chances of a click-thru is
to present more ads. If, to just make up numbers, the chance of a
click is 1 in 10 for the matched ad and 1 in 100 for a random ad,
anonymous consumers would need to see ten times the number of
ads to achieve the same click-thru rate.
The analysis above suggests that consumers might very well
move off defaults if faced with reduced-quality versions of the
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service. If the service explicitly makes clear that additional ads are
being served because the consumer has, by default, opted out of
targeted ads, consumers who wish to minimize ads may be induced
to opt in to a targeted ad regime. Firms almost certainly would
prefer opt-out as firms may expect that consumers will react
negatively to express product degradation.
Firms can with ease set different versions of their products and
may be able to calibrate service levels to induce opt in. They will
almost certainly do more of this if regulators otherwise limit the
extent to which they can accumulate data to engage in targetedadvertising.54 Take Google’s search product as an important case.
Google presents the organic search results surrounded by
sponsored ads on the top and the right side. My guess is that users
aren’t likely to be particularly sensitive to the number of ads on the
right, but might respond to the number of ads presented on top.
Those ads more directly intrude on the organic search results and
this is really just a question of how we divide the fixed space on the
screen between the top-sponsored ads and the organic search
results. In the extreme, Google could present to opt-outs nearly a
full page of sponsored results and only a single organic result. Even
more intrusively, Google could present a pop up splash screen ad
that overlayed the search results and necessitated a click. Google
could then offer users a chance to opt out of splash screens by
opting in to targeted advertising.
Google thinks of itself as a learning company and is constantly
running experiments to improve its service. Under the current
rules, they have little incentive to harness that learning capability to
calibrate opt-in/opt-out. Under the EU’s approach which requires
privacy-friendly default rules, Google or any other targeted
54 The EU’s Article 29 Working party seems to suggest that search engines do not

need access to some version of identity to run their search engines. See Article 29 Search
Engine Opinion, supra note 1, at 25 (“While search engine providers inevitably collect
some personal data about the users of their services, such as IP address, resulting from
standard HTTP traffic, it is not necessary to collect additional personal data from
individual users in order to be able to perform the service of delivering search results and
advertisements.”)
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advertiser will have the incentive to learn precisely how it needs to
set service versions to induce opt ins. If we think that defaults are
powerful with regard to opt-in and opt-out, then we need to learn
whether we can take steps to minimize the role that defaults play.
In a regime in which opt-out is the default setting, firms have little
reason to learn how to induce opt-in. They just set the default as
out and consumers stay out. With opt-out as the default setting,
firms will need to learn how to get consumers to opt in.
The good news is that firms can easily offer multiple versions
of their services to different consumers. Firms will offer an inferior
product—more ads with less relevance—to consumers who have
not opted in to targeted ad serving. Firms will prompt consumers
to opt in to targeted ads: “You are now experiencing the junky
version of our product as mandated by the government because you
have not opted in to targeted advertising. Check the box below if
you would like to opt into targeted ads and get the good version of
our product.”
Opt-in/opt-out is just one issue in our regulation of identity. In
a computer architecture in which identity matters, we then turn to
how identity is managed. Consider the question of identity scope,
though we might well call it identity bundling or identity silos.
The EU’s Article 29 Working Group calls it “data correlation
across services.”55 Take my relationship with Google: if I am
logged into Google Reader—remember, this is my RSS feed
management program—as I am most of the time that my
computer is turned on, what else am I displaying to Google and
how is that information used across services? Google Reader is
really a strong indicator of my interests, as I routinely “star”—mark
as important to me—news stories as I see them so that I can return
to them later.

55 Article 29 Search Engine Opinion, supra note 1, at 20-22.
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Conclusion
For individuals, the basic architecture of computing is changing.
That is obviously about the device itself, with the desktop or laptop
computer now being supplemented with other computing devices
such as the smartphone and the netbook. That switch, coupled
with ubiquitous wireless access, means that many people have
access to computing power whenever and wherever.
The way in which we use these devices has changed. We have
switched from the freestanding world of the desktop computer and
the next stage of surfing the Internet net to consume provided
content to a world in which users interact with each other. This is
the world of Web 2.0, the world of Google, Facebook and Twitter.
This is not just a change in use, but also a change in the
organization of computing power and storage, cloud-computing in
a phrase.
This is also a world of identity, often direct actual real me, on
Facebook and Twitter; an authenticated identity to access my data
stored in the cloud when I use Google Reader or Gmail or another
cloud-based service; and a browser-identity when I use a search
service. And this is also a world of advertising. Web 2.0 and cloudcomputing services are often free to individuals, but they have to be
paid for somehow, and that is usually through advertising.
Advertising is also increasingly important in a world in which the
integrity of the copy itself has weakened and the copy may no
longer serve as a reliable means of organizing payment for content.
This combination of identity and advertising means that this
will be targeted advertising, that is, advertising directed to some
version of me, perhaps actual me as Facebook sees me or browserme as Google sees me. Regulators are now confronting this
intersection of commerce and identity. Individuals have a real
interest in seeing targeted advertising work. That advertising
supports the free services and content that we have all come to
expect on the Internet. But individuals also have a strong interest
in controlling their identities.
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Regulators, especially in the European Union, are moving
towards what they regard as “privacy friendly” default settings for
information tracking by Web 2.0 providers. To date, default
settings have usually put the burden on individuals to opt out of
information tracking. An EU privacy-friendly approach would
seem to reject that. But Web 2.0 providers and cloud-providers
have strong tools for inducing opt in and, indeed, their ability to
provide different levels of their services for different individuals
should make it possible for them to assess quite carefully what it
takes to get individuals to opt in to targeted advertising. So long as
those service providers are not blocked from providing different
levels of service to individuals who have not elected to receive
targeted advertising, moving towards the EU’s privacy-friendly
defaults may have the virtue of pushing us away from an often notso-meaningful default opt in towards more meaningfully calibrated
opt ins exchanged for higher quality services, such as seeing fewer,
better matched ads.
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